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Introduction  
It now seems likely that Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) techniques can provide 
practical building blocks for highly secure networks, and in fact may offer valuable 
cryptographic services, such as unbounded secrecy lifetimes, that can be difficult to 
achieve by other techniques. Unfortunately, however, QKD’s impressive claims for 
information assurance have been to date at least partly offset by a variety of limitations. 
For example, traditional QKD is distance limited, can only be used across a single 
physical channel (e.g. freespace or telecommunications fiber, but not both in series due to 
frequency propagation and modulation issues), and is vulnerable to disruptions such as 
fiber cuts because it relies on single points of failure. 
To a surprising extent, however, these limitations can be mitigated or even 
completely removed by building QKD networks instead of the traditional, stand-alone 
QKD links. Accordingly, a team from BBN Technologies, Boston University, and 
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Harvard University has recently built and begun to operate the world’s first Quantum 
Key Distribution network under DARPA sponsorship1. 
The DARPA Quantum Network became fully operational on October 23, 2003 in 
BBN’s laboratories, and in June 2004 was fielded through dark fiber underneath the 
streets of Cambridge, Mass., to link our campuses with non-stop quantum cryptography, 
twenty-four hours per day. It is the world’s first quantum cryptography network and 
indeed probably the first metro-area QKD deployment in continuous operation. As of 
December 2004, it consists of six QKD nodes. Four are used in BBN-built, interoperable 
weak-coherent QKD systems running at a 5 MHz pulse rate through telecommunications 
fiber, and inter-connected via a photonic switch. Two are NIST-built electronics for a 
high speed free-space QKD system. All run BBN’s full suite of production-quality QKD 
protocols. In the near future, we plan to add four more quantum cryptographic nodes 
based on a variety of physical phenomena, and start testing the resulting network against 
sophisticated attacks. 
This chapter introduces the DARPA Quantum Network as it currently exists and 
briefly outlines our plans for the near future. We first describe the motivation for our 
work and define the basic principles of a quantum cryptographic network (which may be 
                                                 
1 The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the United States Department of Defense, DARPA, or the United States Air Force. 
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composed of a number of QKD systems with relays and/or photonic switches). We then 
discuss the specifics of our current weak-coherent QKD network, including its QKD 
links, photonic switches for “untrusted” networks, and key relay protocols for “trusted” 
networks. We conclude with future plans and our acknowledgements. 
 
Current Status of the DARPA Quantum Network 
Figure 1 displays a fiber diagram of the DARPA Quantum Network’s buildout 
through Cambridge, Mass., as of December 2004. The network consists of two weak-
coherent BB84 transmitters (Alice, Anna), two compatible receivers (Bob, Boris), and a 
2x2 switch that can couple any transmitter to any receiver under program control. Alice, 
Bob, and the switch are in BBN’s laboratory; Anna is at Harvard; and Boris is at Boston 
University. The fiber strands linking Alice, Bob, and the switch are several meters long. 
The Harvard-BBN strand is approximately 10 km. The BU-BBN strand is approximately 
19 km. Thus the Harvard-BU path, through the switch at BBN, is approximately 29 km. 
All strands are standard SMF-28 telecommunications fiber. 
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Figure 1. The Metro-Fiber Portions of the DARPA Quantum Network. 
 
Anna’s mean photon number is 0.5 at present, with the Anna-Bob link delivering 
about 1,000 privacy-amplified secret bits/second at an average 3% Quantum Bit Error 
Rate (QBER). At present the DARPA Quantum Network cannot support fractional mean 
photon numbers to Boris at BU, due to high attenuation in fiber segments across the 
Boston University campus and relatively inefficient detectors in Boris. (BBN-BU 
attenuation is approximately 11.5 dB). Thus the network currently operates at a mean 
photon number of 1.0 on the BBN-BU link, in order to continuously exercise all parts of 
the system, even though the resultant secret key yield is zero. In the near future, fiber 
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splices and perhaps detector upgrades should allow operation to BU with mean photon 
numbers of 0.5. 
The DARPA Quantum Network also contains Ali and Baba, the electronics 
subsystems for a high-speed freespace QKD system designed and built by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Ali and Baba run the BBN QKD 
protocols, and are linked into the overall network by key relay between Ali and Alice. It 
further contains two new entanglement-based nodes named Alex and Bard, built jointly 
by BU and BBN, but these nodes are not yet fully operational. 
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Figure 2. Connectivity Schematic of the DARPA Quantum Network. 
 
Motivation for the DARPA Quantum Network 
QKD provides a technique for two distinct devices to come to agreement upon a 
shared random sequence of classical bits, with a very low probability that other devices 
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(eavesdroppers) will be able to make successful inferences as to those bits’ values. Such 
sequences may then used as secret keys for encoding and decoding messages between the 
two devices. In short, it is a cryptographic key distribution technique 2. Although QKD is 
an interesting and potentially very useful technique for key distribution, it is not the only 
one – human couriers and algorithmic “one-way” functions such as Diffie-Hellman come 
immediately to mind – and thus it is important to gauge QKD’s strengths across a number 
of important goals for key distribution systems in general. Table 1 provides such an 
assessment of “classic” QKD techniques; see [1] for a more extended treatment of this 
subject. 
 
Table 1. Assessment of “Classic” Quantum Cryptography. 
Important Goals for a 
Cryptographic Key 
Distribution System 
QKD Strengths and Weaknesses 
Protection of Keys QKD offers significant advantages in this regard and indeed 
this is the main reason for interest in QKD. Assuming that QKD 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, it is a means for coming to agreement upon a shared key, rather than a way to 
distribute a key, but we follow conventional QKD terminology in this chapter. 
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techniques are properly embedded into an overall secure system, 
they can provide automatic distribution of keys that may offer 
security superior to that of its competitors. 
Authentication QKD does not in itself provide authentication. Current 
strategies for authentication in QKD systems include 
prepositioning of secret keys at the distant device, to be used in 
hash-based authentication schemes, or hybrid QKD-public key 
techniques.  
Robustness This critical property has not traditionally been taken into 
account by the QKD community. Since keying material is 
essential for secure communications, it is extremely important that 
the flow of keying material not be disrupted, whether by accident 
or by the deliberate acts of an adversary (i.e. by denial of service). 
Here QKD has provided a highly fragile service to date since 
QKD techniques have implicitly been employed along a single 
point-to-point link. 
Distance- and 
Location-
This feature is notably lacking in QKD, which requires the two 
entities to have a direct and unencumbered path for photons 
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Independence between them, and which can only operate for a few tens of 
kilometers through fiber. 
Resistance to Traffic 
Analysis 
QKD in general has had a rather weak approach since most 
setups have assumed dedicated, point-to-point QKD links between 
communicating entities which has thus clearly laid out a map of 
the underlying key distribution relationships. 
 
It can be seen that “classic” QKD, i.e., QKD performed by sending a single quantum 
entity directly from source to destination, has areas of weakness mixed with its strengths. 
As important guidelines of our overall research agenda, we are working to strengthen 
QKD’s performance in these weaker areas. A surprising number of these weaknesses, as 
it turns out, can be removed by weaving individual QKD links into an overall QKD 
Network such as the DARPA Quantum Network. 
 
What is a QKD Network? 
Figure 3 depicts a typical, stand-alone QKD system in highly schematic form3. In this 
example, Alice contains both a photon source and a modulator; in this case, Alice 
                                                 
3 In fact, it depicts our ‘Mark 2’ weak-coherent link but corresponding forms of high-level schematics 
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employs an attenuated laser and Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Bob contains another 
modulator and photon detectors, specifically a twin Mach-Zehnder interferometer and 
cooled InGaAs APDs. Here the channel between Alice and Bob is a standard 
telecommunications fiber. 
 
Source Modulation Channel Modulation Detectors
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1550 nm
Telecommunications
Laser
Mach-Zehnder
Interferometer
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Cooled InGaAs
Avalanche
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Mach-Zehnder
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Alice Bob  
Figure 3. High-Level Schematic of an Exemplary QKD Link. 
 
In the network context, this system can be viewed as a single, isolated QKD “link” 
that allows Alice and Bob to agree upon shared cryptographic key material. In our 
terminology, both Alice and Bob are “QKD endpoints,” as are other cryptographic 
stations based on QKD technology, e.g., the Alice or Bob used in plug-and-play systems, 
entanglement-based links with Ekert protocols, and so forth. 
                                                                                                                                                 
can be drawn for any quantum cryptographic system. 
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Figure 4 shows how a number of such QKD endpoints and links may be woven 
together into an overall QKD network. Here we see that one Alice/Bob pair (A1, B1) is 
directly connected via a fiber strand, while another (A2, B2) is connected by a freespace 
channel. Other pairs are connected via fibers and photonic switches, e.g., either A1 or A3 
may be connected to B3 depending on the setting of the switch between them. Multiple 
QKD endpoints, e.g., (B1, A2), may also be grouped into a “key relay device,” whose 
purpose is explained below. 
 
A1 B1
A3 B3
A2 B2 B4
A1 QKD Endpoint
Photonic Switch
Key Relay Device
Fiber Optic Strand
Freespace ChannelA4  
Figure 4. High-Level Schematic of an Exemplary QKD Network. 
 
By proper use of QKD networking protocols, a node such as A1 may agree upon key 
material not just with its direct neighbors (B1 or B3), but indeed with nodes many hops 
away through the key distribution network. For example, it could agree upon shared keys 
with B4, through intermediaries of B1, A2, and B4. Perhaps more surprisingly, it could 
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also agree upon shared keys with other transmitters even though neither transmitter can 
detect the other’s photons! Thus two transmitting nodes such A1 and A3 can agree upon 
shared keys in a quantum cryptographic network – provided that they rely on a trusted 
relay, such as B1, to act as a middleman in this process. 
Photonic Switching for “Untrus ted Networks.” Untrusted networks employ 
unamplified, all-optical paths through the network mesh of fibers, photonic switches, and 
endpoints. Thus a photon from its source QKD endpoint proceeds, without measurement, 
from switch to switch across the optical QKD network until it reaches the destination 
endpoint at which point it is detected. The (A1, B3) path in Figure 3 provides an 
example, though in general a path may transit multiple photonic switches. 
Untrusted QKD networks support truly end-to-end key distribution – QKD endpoints 
need not share any secrets with the key distribution network or its operators. This feature 
could be extremely important for highly secure networks. Unfortunately, though, 
untrusted switches cannot extend the geographic reach of a QKD network. In fact, they 
may significantly reduce it since each switch adds at least a fractional dB insertion loss 
along the photonic path. In addition, it will also prove difficult in practice to employ a 
variety of transmission media within an untrusted network, since a single frequency or 
modulation technique may not work well along a composite path that includes both fiber 
and freespace links. 
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Key Relay for “Trusted Networks.” After a set of QKD nodes have established 
pairwise agreed-to keys along an end-to-end path between two QKD endpoints – e.g., 
(A1, A4) in Figure 3 – they may employ these key pairs to securely relay a key “hop by 
hop” from one endpoint to the other, being onetime-pad encrypted and decrypted with 
each pairwise key as it proceeds from one relay to the next. In this approach, the end-to-
end key will appear in the clear within the relays’ memories proper, but will always be 
encrypted when passing across a link. 
Key relays bring important benefits but are not a panacea. They can extend the 
geographic reach of a network secured by quantum cryptography, since wide-area 
networks can be created by a series of point-to-point links bridged by active relays. 
Furthermore, links can employ heterogeneous transmission media, i.e., some may be 
through fiber while others are freespace. Thus in theory such a network could provide 
fully global coverage. However, QKD key relays must be trusted. Since keying material 
and – directly or indirectly – message traffic are available in the clear in the relays’ 
memories, these relays must not fall into an adversary’s hands. They need to be in 
physically secured locations and perhaps guarded if the traffic is truly important. In 
addition, all users in the system must trust the network (and the network’s operators) with 
all keys to their message traffic. 
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The Major Benefits of QKD Networks. Table 2 below summarizes the major 
benefits that QKD networks bring to traditional, stand-alone QKD links. 
 
Table 2. Major Benefits of Quantum Cryptographic Networks. 
Benefit Discussion 
Longer Distances QKD key relay can easily extend the geographic reach of 
quantum cryptography. As one example, quantum cryptography 
could be performed through telecommunications fiber across a 
distance of 500 km by interposing 4 relays between the QKD 
endpoints, with a span of 100 km fiber between each relay node. 
Heterogenous 
Channels 
QKD key relay can mediate between links based on different physical 
principles, e.g., between freespace and fiber links, or even between 
links based on entanglement and those based on weak laser pulses. 
This allows one to “stitch together” large networks from links that 
have been optimized for different criteria. 
Greater 
Robustness 
QKD networks lessen the chance that an adversary could disable 
the key distribution process, whether by active eavesdropping or 
simply by cutting a fiber. When a given point-to-point QKD link 
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within the network fails – e.g. by fiber cut or too much eavesdropping 
or noise – that link may be abandoned and another used instead. Thus 
QKD networks can be engineered to be resilient even in the face of 
active eavesdropping, fiber cuts, equipment failures, or other denial-
of-service attacks. A QKD network can be engineered with as much 
redundancy as desired simply by adding more links and relays to the 
mesh. 
Cost Savings QKD networks can greatly reduce the cost of large-scale 
interconnectivity of private enclaves by reducing the required (N x N-
1) / 2 point-to-point links to as few as N links in the case of a simple 
star topology for the key distribution network. 
 
BBN’s  ‘Mark 2’ Weak Coherent Systems  
This section describes the four fiber-based QKD systems currently running in the 
DARPA Quantum Network. All became operational in October 2003; we call these 
‘Mark 2’ systems because they replaced our first-generation system which started 
continuous operation in December 2002. These links were inspired by a pioneering Los 
Alamos system [2]. 
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Each Mark 2 link employs a highly attenuated telecommunications laser (hence the 
term “weak coherent”) at 1550.12 nm, phase modulation via unbalanced Mach-Zehnder 
interferometers, and cooled avalanche photo detectors (APDs). Most Mark 2 electronics 
are implemented by discrete components such as pulse generators, though it would not be 
difficult to integrate all electronics onto a small custom board. Figure 5 depicts Anna and 
Boris, our first rack-mounted versions of the Mark 2 hardware, before their deployment 
into wiring closets at Harvard and Boston University as part of the metro network. 
 
 
Figure 5. BBN’s Mark 2 Weak-Coherent Transmitter and Receiver (Anna and Boris). 
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Two aspects of the Mark 2 Weak-Coherent link are fundamental to its overall 
operation and performance. It is important to understand these fundamental points, why 
they occur, and their implications on the overall system. 
First, this link is designed to run through telecommunications fiber as widely 
deployed today. Thus we have chosen to transmit dim pulses in the 1550.12 nm window 
for maximal distance through this fiber. At present, these dim pulses can be best detected 
by certain kinds of commercial APDs cooled to approximately –40 degrees Centrigrade. 
These cooled detectors form one of the most important bottlenecks in the overall link 
performance, as they require on the order of 10 usec to recover between detection events. 
The overall link has been designed to run at up to 5 MHz transmit rate but with a dead-
time circuit to disable the APD after a detection event in order to accommodate this 
recovery interval and detector after-pulsing. 
Second, the Mark 2 Weak-Coherent link employs an attenuated telecommunications 
laser as its source of dim (“single photon”) pulses. This is certainly the easiest kind of 
source to build. However such attenuated, weak-coherent sources have been shown to be 
vulnerable to at least theoretical forms of attack from Eve by Brassard et al [3]. Such 
attacks are generally termed “Photon Number Splitting” (PNS) attacks. For experimental 
purposes, we sometimes run the so-called “Geneva sifting protocol,” or SARG, [4] which 
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may provide protection against such attacks, even in systems employing attenuated laser 
pulses. In addition, our forthcoming entangled link will employ a completely different 
type of source, namely, the BU entangled source. (If possible, we may attempt to build an 
Eve that can actively attack the attenuated pulses used in our Mark 2 Weak-Coherent link 
and perform laboratory demonstrations of this heretofore theoretical form of attack.) 
Figure 6 highlights the major features of our Mark 2 weak-coherent link. As shown, 
the transmitter at Alice sends data by means of very highly attenuated laser pulses at 
1550.12 nm. Each pulse passes through a Mach-Zehnder interferometer at Alice and is 
randomly modulated to one of four phases, thus encoding both a basis and a value in that 
photon’s self interference. The receiver at Bob contains another Mach-Zehnder 
interferometer, randomly set to one of two phases in order to select a basis for 
demodulation. The received single photons pass through Bob’s interferometer to strike 
one of the two cooled detectors and hence to present a received value. Alice also 
transmits bright pulses at 1550.92 nm, multiplexed over the same fiber, to send timing 
and framing information to Bob. 
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Figure 6. Functional Decomposition of the Mark 2 Weak-Coherent QKD Link. 
 
Alice provides the clock source for both transmitter and receiver. All clocking in this 
system ultimately derives from a single trigger supplied from the transmitter suite. The 
rising edge of this signal triggers a pulse generator whose output is split into two pulses: 
one drives the 1550.12 nm QKD data laser to create data pulses and the other the drives 
the 1550.92 nm sync laser through a gate and delay line. The delay line provides a stable 
time relationship between the data and synch pulses, and is chosen so that the sync pulse 
is transmitted about 20 ns after its associated data pulse. 
The data pulse passes through the unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer where 
one arm applies phase shift modulation to the pulse.  A D-to-A converter drives an 
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electro-optic modulator with an analog voltage that produces the Basis and Value phase 
shifts clocked from the transmitter electronics.  In the other arm an adjustable air gap 
delay line allows fine-tuning of the interferometer differential delay.  After exiting the 
interferometer the data pulse is attenuated to achieve the requisite mean photon number.  
A polarizer then removes mistimed replicas of the data pulse that may have been 
generated by misaligned polarization-maintaining components in the interferometer.  At 
the transmitter output the data pulse is combined with the sync pulse in a DWDM optical 
multiplexing filter. 
At the receiver the sync and data pulses are separated with a DWDM filter and the 
sync pulse is detected with a PIN-FET receiver.  This signal is shaped in a pulse 
thresholding circuit that produces two outputs: a 100 ns TTL-level clock signal sent to the 
receiver electronics and a 4 ns NIM-level APD gate-timing pulse that triggers the APD 
gate-pulse generators and the pulse generator driving the APD output line gates.  The 
output line gates are timed to pass only the demodulated data signal from the APDs and 
block noise due to spurious pulse reflections.  An adjustable delay line in the NIM pulse 
interconnection allows fine-tuning of APD gate-pulse timing. 
The data pulse passes through a fiber delay loop to adjust its timing with respect to 
the sync pulse and then through a circulator that is the input to the interferometer 
demodulation circuit.  This interferometer is a folded version of conventional Mach-
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Zehnder design and is independent of the input polarization to accommodate the 
uncontrolled incident polarization at the receiver.  Faraday mirrors at the ends of the 
unequal- length arms reflect light in such a way that the polarization of the light returning 
to the beam splitter is the same for each arm, producing interference with high visibility 
[5].   The Basis is clocked out of the receiver electronics and applied to the electro-optic 
modulator through a D-to-A converter to produce a phase shift of either 0 or p/2.  A pair 
of cooled APDs, biased above avalanche breakdown only during the time a data photon is 
expected to arrive, detect the interferometer outputs, one from the beam splitter and the 
other from the circulator.  After gating to select only the data pulse, the APD signals are 
shaped by threshold detectors and passed as “0” or “1” to the receiver electronics.  
A phase-correcting feedback signal, derived by the receiver from training frames sent 
by the transmitter, is used to maintain phase stability between the transmitter and receiver 
interferometers as path lengths change with temperature and stress.  This phase-
correcting signal is applied to the receiver interferometer electro-optic modulator through 
the transmitter electronics.  Phase correction is also necessary when a transmitter and 
receiver first connect during a start-up or switching operation to obtain the phase-
matched condition needed for low quantum bit error rate. See [6] for a discussion of 
BBN’s algorithms for automatic path- length control. 
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It is by now well-known that certain conventional InGaAs APDs can be operated in 
the single-photon regime if properly cooled and gated. Like many other research teams, 
we have selected Epitaxx EPM 239 AA APDs for our detectors. Even with this special 
treatment, they suffer considerably from low Quantum Efficiency (QE), relatively high 
dark noise, and serious after-pulsing problems. Even so, they provide adequate 
performance for a 5-MHz pulse rate quantum cryptography system. Since custom cooling 
and electronics are required, we designed and built our own cooler package to maintain 
the InGaAs APDs at the requisite operating temperatures. We had two key goals in mind 
for the cooler package: it should be able to operate reliably and repeatably over a wide 
range of temperatures down to –80 C, to enable exploration of detector behavior of over a 
range of operating conditions; and it should be suitable for prototype deployment and 
thus should not require human intervention on a regular basis, e.g., to refill liquid 
nitrogen reservoirs. 
Figure 7 shows a schematic of the core housing, which is a vacuum-pumped chamber 
containing a pair of InGaAs detectors brought to operating temperature by two Peltier 
thermo-electric coolers (TECs). 
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Figure 7. Side and Top Cutaway Views of DARPA Thermo-Electric Cooler Package. 
 
The housing itself is machined aluminum, consisting of a base container plus a 
removable lid. The lid fits snugly with an O-ring so that a vacuum can be maintained in 
the inner chamber. A number of holes pass through the base container to allow hermetic 
feedthrough of fibers and electrical connections. A large connection leads to the vacuum 
line. At the center of the chamber rests a cooled block of copper with holes drilled out for 
two detectors. The detectors are inserted into this block, with fibers fed to the outside 
through a hermetic seal. Microstrip RF connections lead from the side of the container to 
the detectors. These two detectors are the two 1550.12 nm QKD Cooled APDs, i.e., one 
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is D0 and the other is D1. Each detector has its own fiber lead through which come the 
dim pulses for that detector. Each detector also has a set of microstrip RF connectors by 
which the bias voltage may be applied and the detector output led to electronics outside 
the chamber. 
The block of copper rests between two 5-stage Peltier coolers, also known as 
Thermo-Electric Coolers (TECs). We choose two coolers of this size to ensure that we 
had adequate margin for whatever range of temperatures we wanted to explore; two or 
three stages would suffice for routine operation. The chamber also contains a 
thermocouple to measure its current temperature. Electrical leads for the coolers and 
thermocouple pass through hermetic feedthroughs to the outside equipment. 
 
BBN QKD Protocols 
Although a detailed discussion of BBN’s QKD protocols is well beyond the scope of 
this chapter, quantum cryptographic systems contain a surprising amount of sophis ticated 
software. It has been our observation that the optics in quantum cryptography is perhaps 
the easiest part; the electronics are more difficult than the optics; and for a real, functional 
system, the software is harder than the electronics. 
Figure 8 illustrates our software architecture in a high- level form. Here we see that 
the QKD protocols have been integrated into a Unix operating system and provide key 
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material to its indigenous Internet Key Exchange (IKE) daemon for use in 
cryptographically protecting Internet traffic via standard IPsec protocols and algorithms. 
See [7] for a more detailed discussion of this implementation and how QKD interacts 
with IKE and IPsec. 
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Figure 8. The BBN QKD Protocol Suite in Context. 
BBN’s QKD protocol stack is an industrial-strength implementation written in the C 
programming language for ready portability to embedded real-time systems. At present 
all protocol control messages are conveyed in IP datagrams so that control traffic can be 
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conveyed via an internet. However, the control messages could be ported to use other 
forms of communications quite easily, e.g., ATM networks or dedicated channels. 
Two aspects of BBN’s QKD protocol stack deserve special mention. First, it 
implements a complete suite of QKD protocols. In fact, it implements multiple “plug 
compatible” versions of some functions as shown in Figure 7; for instance, it provides 
both the traditional sifting protocol and the newer “Geneva” style sifting [4]4. It also 
provides a choice of entropy estimation functions. We expect to add additional options 
and variants as they are developed. Second, BBN’s QKD protocols have been carefully 
designed to make it as easy as possible to plug in other QKD systems, i.e., to facilitate the 
introduction of QKD links from other research teams into the overall DARPA Quantum 
Network. 
 
Photonic Switching for Untrusted Networks 
The DARPA Quantum Network currently consists of two transmitters, Alice and 
Anna, and two compatible receivers, Bob and Boris, interconnected through their key 
transmission link by a 2 x 2 optical switch. In this configuration, either transmitter can 
                                                 
4 For some time, we ran traditional sifting during week days and Geneva sifting over the weekends to 
gain realistic experience with both. 
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directly negotiate a mutual key with either receiver. The switch must be optically passive 
so that the quantum state of the photons that encode key bits is not disturbed. 
Figure 9 depicts the fiber-based portion of the current network diagram. Here all four 
QKD endpoints are connected through a conventional 2x2 optical switch. At one switch 
position, Alice is connected to Bob, and Anna to Boris. At the other, Alice is connected 
to Boris, and Anna to Bob. At present the switch controller changes this connectivity on a 
periodic basis, e.g., every 15 minutes. Immediately after the switch setting is changed, the 
receivers autonomously discover that they are receiving photons from a new transmitter, 
and realign their Mach-Zehnder interferometers to match the transmitter’s 
interferomenter. Then they begin to develop new key material by performing the BBN 
QKD protocols with this new transmitter. 
 
AliceAlice BobBob
AnnaAnna BorisBoris
2 x 2
Optical
Switch
 
Figure 9. Current Topology of the DARPA Quantum Network. 
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The switch chosen for this network is a standard telecommunications facilities switch 
that operates by moving reflective elements that change the internal light path to produce 
either a BAR or CROSS connection. It is operated by applying a TTL-level pulse to 
either the BAR or CROSS pin for 20 ms and latches in the activated position.  Switching 
time is 8 ms and optical loss is <1 dB. Figure 10 shows a photograph of the switch 
mounted on a PC board with the electrical interconnects on the left and optical 
interconnects on the right. 
 
 
Figure 10. The 2x2 optical switch mounted on a PC board. 
 
 
BBN Key Relay Protocols for Trusted Networks 
When two QKD endpoints do not have a direct or photonically-switched QKD link 
between them, but there is a path between them over QKD links through trusted relays, 
novel BBN-designed networking protocols allow them to agree upon on shared QKD 
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bits. They do so by choosing a path through the network, creating a new random number 
R, and essentially sending R one-time-pad encrypted across each link. We call this 
process “key relay,” and the resultant network a “trusted network” since the chief 
characteristic of this scheme is that the secrecy of the key depends not just on the 
endpoints being trustworthy; the intermediate nodes must also be trusted.   
The BBN key relay protocols have been continuously operational in the DARPA 
Quantum Network since October 2003. In fact, they run continuously in our network 
through Cambridge, and allow Alice to build up a reservoir of shared key material with 
Anna, even though both entities are transmitters, via a trusted relay at Bob or Boris. 
Similarly Bob and Boris continuously build up shared key material via trusted relays at 
Alice or Anna. 
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Figure 11. Major Aspects of the Key Relay Protocols. 
 
The four main aspects of key relay are illustrated in Figure 11.  Figure 11-A makes it 
clear that a key relay network is parallel to an overarching network conveying 
communication messages and control traffic such as the QKD protocols. Here the 
Internet is the communications network, each link underneath it is a separate QKD link, 
and circular nodes are key relay stations. In Figure 11-B, one particular source QKD 
endpoint (S) wishes to agree upon key material with a far-away destination QKD 
endpoint (D). Since both endpoints, S and D, are connected to a ubiquitous 
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communications network, they can perform QKD protocols in order to derive key 
material, and once they have agreed upon these keys, they can then use the Internet to 
communicate between themselves securely. 
Figure 11-C shows a path used for key relay from S to D, as darkened lines across the 
key relay network, and the resultant pairs of QKD key material at the right. One QKD-
derived key is shared between S and R1; this key is denoted K(S,R1). Likewise K(R1,R2) 
denotes the key pairwise shared between relay nodes R1 and R2, and so forth. Once all 
these pairwise keys are in place, S and D can easily derive their own end-to-end shared 
secret key by key relay. One obvious means is for node S to create a new random number 
R, protected this number R by K(S,R1), and transmit the result to R1. Node R1 can then 
decrypt this message to obtain R itself, and re-encrypt it by K(R1, R2) to send it onwards 
to R2, who can in turn repeat the process, and so forth, until it has been relayed all the 
way to D. At this point, both S and D know the same secret random sequence, R, and can 
use this shared value as key material. 
Finally, Figure 11-D shows the BBN key relay protocols can automatically discover 
failures along the key relay path – whether due to cut fiber or eavesdropping – and route 
the key material around these failures. 
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Future Plans  
Our near-term plans call for augmenting the DARPA Quantum Network with four 
new QKD nodes: one pair based on entangled photons in fiber, and the other on polarized 
photons in a freespace channel. 
· The entangled link’s optical subsystem has been designed and shaken down by 
Boston University, and is now resident at BBN’s laboratory. All electronics and 
software have been built. Once the entangled system is fully operational, we will 
tie it via key relay into the overall DARPA Quantum Network. 
· The freespace link will be based on polarization modulation of faint laser pulses 
at visible wavelengths. The transmitter will contain 4 lasers, one for each 
polarization basis and value, which pulse according to externally-supplied random 
signals; the receiver will perform passive random splitting via a 50/50 coupler. 
This link will also be woven into the DARPA Quantum Network when 
operational. 
 
Summary 
The DARPA Quantum Network has married a variety of QKD techniques to well-
established Internet technology in order to build a secure key distribution system that can 
be employed in conjunction with the public Internet or, more likely, with private 
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networks based on the Internet Protocol suite. Such private networks are currently in 
widespread use around the world with customers who desire secure and private 
communications, e.g., financial institutions, governmental organiza tions, militaries, and 
so forth. 
The DARPA Quantum Network has been in continuous operation in BBN’s 
laboratory since October 2003, and since June 2004 through dark fiber linking the 
Harvard, Boston University, and BBN campuses. It currently consists of four 
interoperable QKD nodes designed for use through telecommunications fiber, and a 
passive photonic switch that interconnects them; a high-speed free-space system designed 
and built by NIST; and a full suite of production-quality QKD protocols running on all 
nodes. Key material derived from these systems is integrated into the Internet security 
protocols (IPsec) to protect user traffic. 
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